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1.   The emergence of a new consensus on the way of understanding omissive 
causation: the distinction between general causation and specific or individual 
causation.  Professional diseases. – Is a new consensus emerging on the way 
of understanding omissive causation?  The question assumes the existence of 
an old consensus, something which, in fact, occurred, starting from the 
eighties, in our case law concerning medical-surgical activity within the theory 
of the “serious and appreciable probabilities of success” (probabilities 
sometimes indicated at less than 50%) (1 ) and in our case law on professional 
diseases following the theory of the “capability” of human conduct to do harm 
and that of the increase or lack of decrease in risk (2).  
                                  
1 See, amongst others, III Civil Section, Cassation, 13th May 1982, no. 3013 in FIORI-
BOTTONE-D’ALESSANDRO, Forty Years of Jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation on 
Medical Liability, Milan, 2000, p. 260 ss.; Criminal section IV Cass., 12th May 1983, no. 4320, 
ivi, p. 302 ss.; Penal sect. IV Cass., 10th July 1987, no. 8290, ivi, p. 515 ss.; Penal sect. IV 
Cass., 27th August 1987, no. 9410, ivi, p. 527 ss.; Penal sect. IV Cass, 12th May 1989, no. 
7118, ivi, p. 606 ss.; Penal sect. IV Cass, 13th June 1990, ivi 1991, p. 588; Penal sect. IV 
Cass, 10th August 1990, no. 11389, ivi, p. 665 ss.; Penal sect. IV Cass. 23rd November 1990, 
no. 15565, ivi, p. 677 ss,; Penal sect. IV Cass. 17th January 1992, no. 371, ivi, p. 702 ss., 
Penal sect. IV Cass., 7th July 1993, n. 6683, ivi, p. 733 ss.; Civil sect. III Cass. 16th November 
1993, n. 11287, ivi, p. 750 ss.; Penal IV sect. Cass, 11th November 1994, in Cass. Pen.1996, 
p. 1442; Penal IV sect. Cass., 7th December 1999, in Giur. it. 2001, p. 572 ss; Penal sect. IV 
Cass., 18th October 1990, in  Cass.Pen., 1992, p. 2102; Penal sect. IV Cass., 7th March 1989, 
in Riv. pen., 1990, p. 119  
2 See opinions mentioned in F. STELLA, Giustizia e modernità, Milan, 3rd ed. 2003, p. 246 ss. 
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 The old consensus did not survive in the whole: the Full Bench of the 
Supreme Court (Sezioni unite della Corte Suprema di Cassazione) 
condemned the well-known criterion of the “indefinite, changeable probability 
coefficients that can be manipulated by the interpreter” and the criterion of the 
increase or lack of decrease in risk (3). Unfortunately, the old consensus has 
not yet been replaced by a new one: the bases on which it will rest are, 
however, emerging. 
 The distinction between general causation and specific causation is 
one of the main positions taken by these bases: this is a distinction that has 
burst into the juridical world in recent decades thanks to young sciences such 
as epidemiology and animal biology or more noble sciences such as medicine; 
it expresses very strongly the need not to confuse the forecast of what we 
“generally” expect to happen in the future for the populations under 
investigation or for classes or abstract types of individuals, with that which has 
really happened in the individual specific case, i.e. on the ground of individual 
causation.  The ex ante capability of an active or omissive conduct to result in 
a certain damage, ex ante probabilities associated to it, the increase or lack of 
decrease of the risk that can be attributed to them, the increase or decrease of 
“chances” of safety are equivalent notions that all define the sphere of general 
causation: they cannot tell us ex post what caused an individual harmful event, 
they do not allow us to identify the conduct that has really caused the event or 
to prove on an individual basis the cause of specific or individual events (4). 
 There is a fairly wide-spread consensus in our jurisprudence on this 
distinction relating to professional diseases (5);  however, there is failure on the 
part of the Supreme Court to agree explicitly about this, which explains the 
reasons why consensus on the new way of understanding omissive causation 
has not yet made any headway in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. To 
find out what would have happened if the omitted  proper conduct had 
occurred, the Supreme Court often continues to use general causation (6), 
                                  
3 See Cass. sect. un. pen., 10.7-11.9.2002, in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen. 2002, p. 1133 ss.  
4 The distinction between general causation and specific or individual causation is illustrated in 
detail in F. STELLA, Giustizia e modernità, cit., p. 231 ss., 237 ss., 245 ss., 253 ss., 294 ss., 
308 ss., 327 ss., 350 ss. 
5 See, amongst others, Venice Court, 22.10.2001 in Cass. pen. 2003, p. 267 ss. for which, on 
the basis of epidemiological tests “there is no possibility of distinguishing in case of exposure  
a subject who would not have become sick if he had not been exposed from another who 
would have become sick in any case”. The Court emphasizes the importance of the quoted 
distinction: “causation is general when a substance is capable of causing a damage or a 
disease in a particular situation, while causation is specific when it has caused damage to the 
individual person”; see also request for filing of the Prosecution Office at the Court of Brindisi, 
4.5.2004, unpublished, in which, in the investigation relating to the carcinogenic effects of vinyl 
chloride “general causation at the most can be considered a starting point, but certainly not an 
arrival point”, i.e. the demonstration of individual causation through “the causal process that 
leads to the occurrence of the carcinogenic pathology”; Milan Court, pen. sect. IX, 13.2.2003, 
unpublished (the content of which is referred to by STELLA,  L’allergia alle prove della 
causalità individuale  (Allergy towards proof of individual causation), in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen. 
2004, p. 412 ss.) for which there is no point in raising the problem of the causal relationship if 
general causation is not proven.   
6 See the opinions commented by F. STELLA, L’allergia alle prove della causalità individuale, 
quoted p. 394 ss. (cases Macola, Trioni, Giacomelli, Monti, Piessevaux, Eva). 
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without realising that only specific causation, the ex post explanation of the 
individual harmful event, can inform us on the omitted prevention of the event. 
 What is most regrettable is that many Supreme Court Justices are not 
willing to surrender to this point of view and  while underlying “the difference 
between general and specific causation”, pointing out that “the capability of a 
substance to cause specific consequences does not mean that it did cause 
them in the individual case”, do not hesitate to hold that general causation 
itself can also “result in a statement of liability”, as in the case of pleural 
mesothelioma for which “it now seems to be scientifically proven that it is 
caused almost exclusively (in the sense that other unknown causes may be 
actually ascertained and excluded) by exposure to or inhalation of asbestos 
fibres” (7).  But the strength of scientific evidence will get rid of every prejudice: 
I have already had occasion to demonstrate that, on the basis of the most 
recent scientific research, it is impossible to distinguish a mesothelioma due 
to occupational exposure from a mesothelioma due to other causes (8). 
 When all is said and done, I believe there are sufficiently strong and  
firm bases for a widening of the consensus to all Italian case law.  Even the 
Supreme Court will presumably be forced to reduce the weight and explicative 
power of probabilities identified by epidemiological research. 
 I have illustrated these bases in detail in “Justice and Modernity” and in 
the paper “The allergy in proof of individual causation”.  An adequate synthesis 
could be given here with the words of the epidemiologist VINEIS: 
 
“The paradigm of epidemiology may be defined as the ‘black box’ method, because  the aim of 
epidemiological research is usually that of finding a causal relationship between any external 
event (‘exposure’) and the risk of disease, without going into pathogenetic mechanisms.  
The epidemiology of chronic diseases does not require a “strong” assumption about the causal 
relationship: by cause we mean any exposure that precedes the onset of the disease, 
compatible with a period of biological induction and that increases the probability of 
contracting the disease.  On the one hand, there is an obvious rejection of the deterministic 
concept of cause (or at least of the necessary cause); on the other hand, historically, 
epidemiology of chronic diseases has not been very interested either in defining ‘injuries’ as the 
anatomical substratum of the causal relationship (for example, at the study of interim events in 
the pathogenetic sequence of carcinogenesis) or in classifying problems. Actually, the 
classification of a group of diseases such as cancer continues to rely on a morphological basis 
– i.e. to be founded on the microscopic aspect – rather than on a aetiologic basis like 
infectious diseases. This happens for the simple reason that one type of cancer has multiple 
causes, and that cases due to one particular kind of exposure cannot be materially 
distinguished, on the morphological level, from those due to another type of exposure” (9). 
 
                                  
7 Brusco, Il vizio di motivazione nella valutazione della prova scientifica, in Dir. pen. proc. 
11/2004, p. 1415. The unusual interpretation given by Justice Brusco to the Daubert verdict 
should also be mentioned “the criteria identified in the Daubert case” would actually constitute 
“in fact, norms or rules of experience” (p. 1414).  In the analysis of the immense amount of 
litterature on the Daubert case, I had never seen the most important stance taken by the 
American Supreme Court on the scientific method and on the topic of the reliability of the laws 
of science downgraded to a stance on banal norms of experience, by definition and by a 
current commonly accepted opinion, very far from the dignity of scientific enunciations.  On the 
Daubert verdict see F. STELLA, Giustizia e modernità, p. 458 ss.   
8 F. STELLA, L’allergia alle prove della causalità individuale, cit., p. 414 ss. 
9 P. VINEIS, L’interpretazione causale degli studi epidemiologici (The causal interpretation of 
epidemiologic studies, in Causalità tra diritto e medicina (Causation between Law and 
Medicine), Atti del Convegno nazionale di Medicina Legale, Pavia, 1992, p. 47 ss.    
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 The probabilistic nature of causal inference in epidemiology (exposure 
increased the probabilities of contracting the disease) is therefore beyond 
dispute; and one of the most obvious implications of this nature is the 
impossibility of identifying ex post workers who would not have fallen sick 
without exposure and those that would have fallen sick anyway: “all 
epidemiological inferences, VINEIS points out, are drawn from studies on 
populations and refer exclusively to populations”; that’s the reason of “the 
conflict between the individual and population level: it can be stated that in a 
group of people exposed to asbestos, the risk of contracting lung cancer is 
higher than in a group of non-exposed people, without this statement being 
valid for individuals”(10).  In the same way, the epidemiologist Berrino states: 
 
“When we say that a certain percent of  cancers is due to professional causes, the population 
numbers (expected cases) do not derive from a census of cases that have been proved to be 
caused by exposure,  but from the difference between the cases observed in exposed people and 
the number of cases that would have been expected if the incidence in the people exposed was 
equal to that of the people that were not exposed”... There is no possibility of distinguishing, in 
exposed cases, those who would not have fallen sick in any case... In order to state that an exposed 
person would not have fallen sick in the absence of exposure, the judge would have to draw lots”(11). 
  
This way of thinking is shared by epidemiologist and industrial hygienists all 
over the world (12) and it is difficult therefore to understand why there is not a 






2.   Omission in medical-surgical activity: the distinction between ex ante 
probability and ex post concrete proof  (particularistic proof).  – Considerable 
difficulties in forming the new consensus have arisen, however, in the area of 
medical-surgical activity; and it is on this type of activity that I will now focus my 
remarks. 
The distinction between ex ante probability and ex post proof is under 
discussion: the former are abstract probabilities, that refer to abstract types 
or classes of conditions and events that do not constitute proof of what really 
happened on a particular occasion, or of what would have happened in the 
past had there been no omission; ex ante probabilities are useful when we are 
trying to see what we expect to happen in the future, but they do  not constitute 
an adequate basis for an ex post explanation.  Concrete proofs, proofs relating 
to the individual particular case (the so-called particularistic proof) that give 
us information on individual causation (13) are necessary for this explanation. 
                                  
10 P. VINEIS, op.loc. cit. 
11 BERRINO, Candido atteggiamento o denuncia di comportamenti inadeguati?, in La 
medicina del lavoro, 1988, p. 167. 
12 See on this point the long list of epidemiologists, industrial hygienists, forensic doctors and 
legal scholars quoted in F. STELLA, Giustizia e modenità, p. 296 ss. 
13 See, for all, R. W. WRIGHT, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, 
and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush in Clarifying the Concepts, in 73 Iowa L. Rev., 1988, p. 
5 
The example of “a throw of the dice” is sufficient to illustrate, with the words 
of a well-known American opinion, the difference between ex ante probabilities 
and particularistic proof: “quantitative probability (ex ante) expresses in any 
case only the most probable result, it does not constitute proof nor the 
probatory elements of the proposition that must be proven; the fact that in a 
throw of the dice there is a quantitative probability (ex ante) or a greater 
probability that a number lower than six may appear on the side of the dice 
pointing upwards, is not proof of the fact that in a given throw of the dice this is 
what actually happened.  Without something more, the actual result of the 
throw would be totally unknown.  The smallest concrete (particularistic) proof 
that the six actually appeared on the upper side of the dice would, on the other 
hand, have more weight than all the ex ante probabilities calculated in another 
way” (14). 
 This is the true essence of the thought of the Full Bench of the Corte di 
Cassazione, expressed with the well-known verdict of 2002 (Franzese opinion) 
when it rejects, as extraneous to our judiciary, the criterion of the increase or 
the lack of decrease of risk, and when it rejects the idea that omissive 
causation can be considered to exist in the hypothesis in which omitted proper 
conduct would have had “serious and appreciable probabilities of success”. 
The Full Bench agrees on what has just been illustrated:  ex ante probabilities 
are not able to offer the ex post causal explanation  which is necessary in the 
area of omission  too(15). 
For the Full Bench of the Supreme Court also, the ex post causal 
explanation needs particularistic proof.  And in fact, after stating the 
cornerstone of its own thought, the need to resort to a covering law “an 
antecedent can be considered a necessary condition only if it falls within the 
list of those which, on the basis of a regular succession, comply with a 
generalized rule of experience or with a law possessing scientific validity, a 
‘covering law’, and leads to events ‘of the same type’ as the one that actually 
occurred”), the Full Bench indicates its second cornerstone in particularistic 
proof: “it remains the unavoidable duty of judicial knowledge to establish if the 
postulated nomological connection is actually pertinent”.  After ascertaining 
this, research into the “available evidence” relating to specific elements of the 
actual case that excludes any reasonable doubt “on the real conditioning 
efficacy of individual omissive conduct within the causation web is equally 
unavoidable”.  In other words, “it is not allowed to deduce automatically from 
the probability coefficient expressed by statistical law..... confirmation or lack of 
confirmation of the accusatory hypothesis concerning the existence of the 
causal relationship”; and it is not allowed because it is “the circumstances of 
                                                                                                
1001, 1077, translated in F. STELLA, I saperi del giudice.  La Causalità e il ragionevole 
dubbio, Milano, 2004, p. 139 ss. 
14 Day vs Boston & Me R.R., (1902) Me 207, 52 A 771 quoted in R. WRIGHT, op:cit., p. 1052.   
15Cass.Sez.Un.Pen 10.7.2002, in Riv. It. Dir. Proc. Pen., 2002, p. 1133 ss. On the matter M. 
Donini recently affirmed that “after twenty years of convictions, a certain convergence would 
seem to have been reached (the conditional form is unavoidable) on the unlawfulness of the 
substitution (hermeneutically) of omissive causation required by law with imputation 
parameters founded on the mere increase in risk”.DONINI, Il volto attuale dell’illecito penale. 
La democrazia penale tra differenziazione e sussidiarietà, Milan, 2004, 2004 p. 122 s. 
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the fact and the available evidence” which – “on the result of the probatory 
reasoning that has also excluded the interference of alternative factors” – must 
indicate if we can reach the conclusion that the omissive conduct is 
procedurally certain ...and was a necessary condition for the harmful event”.     
 
 
3.  Ex ante probability and medical-surgical activity.  – A brief review of some 
italian opinions on medical-surgical activity will now confirm that ex ante 
probabilities cannot give us any information about what would happen if the 
omitted conduct had been realised. 
 In a recent important trial, some executives of a chemical plant had 
been accused by the Public Prosecutor of having made it impossible to make 
an early diagnosis of some liver cancers contracted  by workmen exposed to a 
certain chemical substance, thus preventing the transplant and resection of the 
liver and therefore causing  their premature death. 
 From the cross-examination of experts, the crucial nature of the 
distinction between ex ante  and ex post probability emerged; according to the 
experts, the real great limitation of transplantology, in treating liver, is that the 
factors on the basis of which the transplant or resection is decided are 
predictive factors, in the sense that they predict if the patient will live or die 
following the transplant or resection, and therefore they are limited to indicating 
ex ante probabilities; after resection, and therefore a posteriori, the surgeon 
may notice that the tumour was too aggressive, and that therefore the 
operation should not have taken place because, by performing it, the patient’s 
life had been shortened rather than lengthened. 
The truth is that early diagnosis of tumoral diseases – this is still the 
opinion of the experts – gives an artificial increase in survival: ex ante 
probabilities can indicate survival of one year after resection; ex post, the 
surgeon notices that, even without resection, the patient would have survived 
for a year.  Survival after the resection of liver cancers caused by cirrhosis can 
even reach 20 or 30% of early identified cases, but that means that in 70, 80% 
of cases, the operation reveals itself to be inefficacious ex post (16). 
 Therefore the serious error to be found in the prosecution’s hypothesis 
is clear: it relied on ex ante probabilities, on predictive factors that are unable 
to tell us anything about what would have happened if early diagnosis had 
been carried out. 
 The situation does not change if, from transplants and resections of the 
liver we go on to the resection of lung tumours.  Here also, we come up 
against ex ante probabilities that predict what would have happened in the 
case of immediate diagnosis and surgery. 
 Again, this has nothing to do with what actually happened or what would 
have really happened: from an ex post investigation it would appear that the 
patient who underwent immediate lung resection did not survive the operation, 
or died immediately after it because of complications such as myocardial 
                                  
16 Court of Venice, 22.10.2002 hearing 18.5.99, cross examination of Prof. Colombo that can 
be consulted on the web site www.petrolchimico.it. 
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infarction, lung failure, pneumonia, pulmonary embolism, renal failure and so 
forth. 
 The available data in the sector confirm our statement.  To begin with, in 
one study conducted in the United States in 2004 (17), out of 55 patients 
diagnosed with tumours, also on the basis of computerised tomography (CAT), 
in 10 patients the diagnosis was found to be wrong ex post: instead of cancer, 
a benign disease was found.  What is to be said about ex ante probability 
here?   
 There are many other examples I can quote. As to the mortality rate 
during the first 30 days after the operation, in a Spanish 1997 study, out of 605 
patients who underwent thoractomy due to bronchogenic carcinoma, 40 
patients died after surgery for causes due, above all, to respiratory failure (18); 
in a Swiss study carried out in 1999, out of 621 patients who underwent lung 
resection due to lung cancer, 19 died, within 30 days from surgery, due to 
cardio-vascular complications, haemorrhages, sepsis and acute damage to the 
lungs (19); according to a subsequent Swiss study in 2002, out of 193 patients 
who underwent pneumonectomy, the mortality frequency at 30 days after 
surgery was equal to 9.3% and was mainly co-related to haemorrhages, 
pneumonia, bronchopulmonary and hemipulmonary fistulae, arhythmia and 
pulmonary embolisms (20); according to a Norwegian study of 2004, out of 
2,528 patients who underwent pulmonary resection, 188 died within 60 days 
due to respiratory failure, pneumonia, haemorrhages, broncho-pleural fistulae, 
myocardium infarction or other complications (21). 
 According to an Italian study conducted by the National Research 
Council and by the Ministry of Education in 2003, post-operative mortality is 2-
9%, correlated to pneumonia, ARDS (Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome), 
atelectasis, respiratory failure, pulmonary embolism, pulmonary oedema, 
myocardium infarction, arhythmia, heart failure, haemorrhagic gastritis, 
parenchymal fistulae, bronchial fistulae, infection of the surgical wound, 
haemothorax (22). 
 The question is once more: what must we say about ex ante 
probabilities? In plain words, to exclude that if the proper omitted conduct 
(early diagnosis and immediate surgery) had been observed the patient 
would not have died following resection, due to myocardium infarction, 
pneumonia,  pulmonary oedema, respiratory failure, haemorrhage, kidney 
failure or other complications, is simply impossible. It is impossible to give 
                                  
17 CRESTARELLO et al., Thoracic Surgical Operations in Patients Enrolled in a Computer 
Tomographic Screening Trial, in The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery, 2004, p. 
254 ss. 
18 DUQUE et al., Early Complications in Surgical Treatment of Lung Cancer: A Prospective 
Multicenter Study, in The Annals of Thoracic Surgery, 1997, p. 944-950. 
19 LICKER et al., Perioperative Mortality and Major Cardiopulmonary Complications after Lung 
Surgery for Non-small Cell Carcinoma, in European Journal of Cardio-Thoracic Surgery, 1999, 
p. 314-319. 
20 LICKER et al., Risk Factors for Early Mortality and Major Complications Following 
Pneumonectomy for Non-small Cell Carcinoma of the Lung, in Chest, 2002, p. 1890-1897.  
21 ROSTAND, NEALSUND, JACOBSTEIN et al., Causes of Postoperative Mortality after Lung 
Cancer Surgery, in Tidsskr Nor Laegeforen, 2004, p. 982 ss. 
22 CNR-MIUR oncological project, I tumori del polmone, 24.11.2003, p. 2-39. 
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particularistic proof and to identify the ex post probabilities associated to it, as 
we should do in order to formulate a causal statement that explains what 
would actually have happened. 
 The impossibility is even more obvious if we consider the deaths of 
patients where a timely diagnosis was made of a small nodule.  In a study 
carried out in 2002 and published on the authoritative journal New England 
Journal of Medicine (23) we read the following: “however, the size of the nodule 
at diagnosis does not necessarily correlate with the clinical outcome.  It cannot 
be assumed that the biologic conduct of lung cancer, the result of a variety of 
genetic changes, parallels anatomical size.  In fact, there are currently no 
data to confirm that a primary 5-mm lung tumour has a significantly better 
prognosis than a 10-mm tumour or even a 30-mm tumour.  In a recent study 
on 510 patients with T1M0M0 disease (tumours less than 3 cm in diameter), 
there was no statistical correlation between small size at diagnosis and 
survival.  Patients with 3-cm masses had the same outcomes as those 
with nodules less than 1 cm. in diameter.  The assumptions that tumors size 
correlates with biologic conduct and that small lesions are equivalent to early-
stage disease have not been confirmed for lung cancer.  In some studies, 
about 60% of patients with clinical (detected through x-rays) stage 1 disease 
(tumours less than 3 cm in diameter) died from lung cancer within 5 years, 
despite appropriate therapy.  This suggests that a high percentage of patients 
have disseminated, occult disease at the time of presentation”. 
 And here is the situation for gastro-intestinal tumours: according to an 
American study of 2000, out of 4,711 patients who underwent colectomy as a 
result of cancer of the colon, death within 30 days occurred in 335 cases 
(5.7%): mortality frequency was significantly higher (equal to 50%) in patients 
with complications compared with those without, i.e. in cases of post-surgical 
coma, cardiac arrest, kidney failure, lung embolism or infection of the urinary 
tract (24); in a Hungarian study of 2002, out of 161 patients who had undergone 
a gastrectomy operation, 61 had suffered complications (anastomotic leak, 
septic complications, intraluminal haemorrhage, post-surgical pancreatitis, 
intra-abdominal haemorrhage, pancreatic fistulae, obstructions of the small 
intestine, complications of the cardio-respiratory system) and 8 patients died 
during the post-surgical period (25); in a Canadian study of 2003, out of 19,511 
people that had undergone oesophagectomy or resection of the colon or 
rectum, the mortality rate in 30 days following the operations varied from 3.8% 
for resection of the colon or rectum to 13.4% for oesophagectomy (26); in an 
American study of 2004, out of 22,633 patients who underwent surgical 
resection, for  colorectal cancer, mortality at 30 days as a result of the 
                                  
23 PATZ et al., Screening for Lung Cancer, in NEJM, vol. 343, n.22. 
24 LONGO et al., Risk Factors for Morbidity and Mortality after Colectomy for Colon Caner, in 
Dis. Colon Rectum 2000, p. 83-89. 
25 SZUCS et al., Effect of Extending the Resection on Postoperative Complications of Total 
Gastrectomies: Experience with 161 Operations, in Magy Seb, 2002 p. 362-68. 
26 URBACH et al., Differences in Operative Mortality between High-and-low-volume Hospitals 
in Ontario for 5 Major Surgical Procedures: Estimating the Number of Lives Potentially Saved 
Through Regionalization, in CMAJ, 2003, p. 1049-14. 
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operation was equal to 2.8% in patients under 65 years of age with cancer of 
the  colon, while it was 5.6% in patients of over 65 years of age (27). 
 Here again, what about ex ante probabilities?  How would the judge 
possibly exclude that the patient would have died as well from post-surgical 
coma, kidney failure, pulmonary embolism, cardiac arrest, haemorrhage, post-
surgical pancreatitis or other complications? 
 And what about myocardium infarction? 
According to an American study of the early Nineties, out of 200 
patients hospitalised with diagnosis of acute infarction of the lower 
myocardium, at the time of admission to hospital 22 patients (11%) had had a 
cardiogenic shock. 38 patients died (19%) and 94 patients had serious 
complications during hospitalisation, including cardiogenic shock, ventricular 
fibrillation, tachycardia, myocardium rupture, third degree atrioventricular 
blockage, chronic bradycardia and re-infarction: most of these complications 
occurred in the 24 hours immediately following hospitalisation.  In this period of 
time, 13 patients died due to cardiac causes (7%) and 58 patients had more 
serious complications (28); according to another American study carried out in 
1999,  out of 9,076 hospitalised patients an overall incidence of 7.1% of 
cardiogenic shock cases was registered for the whole study period considered: 
the analysis also showed that patients with acute infarction in which 
cardiogenic shock had occurred had a significantly higher mortality incidence 
during hospitalisation than those in whom cardiogenic shock had not occurred 
(71.1% compared with 12.0%).  Mortality during the hospitalisation of patients 
with cardiogenic shock remained constant over the years, equal to 
approximately 77% (29); according to a multi-centric American study of 2002, 
out of 5,065 patients who underwent coronary bypass surgery, 165 patients 
died during hospitalisation (3.2%) and 812 (16%) had cardiac, cerebral, renal 
or gastro-intestinal complications.  100% of these deaths were associated to 
one or more adverse ischemic events.  43 patients died in the 48 hours 
immediately after the operation (and 291 had had complications that were not 
fatal in this period).  In 121 cases, death occurred in the 48 hours following 
revascularisation (30); according to an Italian study of 2004, from 10 to 15% of 
hospitalised patients died because of acute cardiogenic shock (31). 
 At this point we know the question we should ask: since we know that 
the ex ante probabilities of survival are certainly higher in the event of 
immediate hospitalisation, compared with cases of non-hospitalisation, how 
can we known ex post if the patient with myocardial infarction who was not 
                                  
27 RABENECK et al., Outcomes in Elderly Patients Following Surgery for Colorectal Cancer in 
the Veterans Affaire Health Care System, in Aliment Pharmacol. Ther,.  2004, p. 1115-24.      
28 ZEHENDER et al., Right Ventricular Infarction as an Independent Predictor of Prognosis 
after Acute Inferior Myocardial Infarction, in The New England Journal of Medicine, 1993, p. 
981-88. 
29 GOLDBERG et al., Temporal Trends in Cardiogenic Shock Complicating Acute Myocardial 
Infarction, in The New England Journal of Medicine, 1999, p. 1162-68. 
30 MANGANO et al., Aspirin and Mortality from Coronary Bypass Surgery, in The New England 
Journal of Medicine, 2002, p. 1309-1317.  
31 VITALI et al., Surgical Treatment of Acute Myocardial Infarction, in Italian Heart J., 2004 
(Supp. 6), p. 92-96. 
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hospitalised immediately, would have died from cardiogenic shock or not, in 
the case of immediate hospitalisation?  There is no way to know this, which 
means that the judge is not able to exhibit particularistic proof with associated 
ex post probabilities that the proper omitted conduct would have prevented the 
harmful event. 
 The problems linked to ex ante diagnosis-prognosis and to the ex post 
explanation of individual events in clinical medicine are also quite significant. 
 Clinical diagnosis tout court aims at knowing as much as possible about 
the patient’s current situation and the therapy to be implemented in the 
disease is inferred from this knowledge: it “can never be declared true beyond 
any shadow of a doubt” (32); the prognosis consists in the “prediction that the 
doctor, on the basis of the factual elements collected and/or of the suspected 
diagnosis, formulates on the future course of the morbid phenomena of his 
patient” (33).  Since the diagnostic judgement of the doctor can be either of the 
nosographic type (founded on the use of categories) or of the physiopathologic 
type (characterised by explicative reasoning of a causal nomologic type), the 
prognosis can also have this dual nature (34). 
If the diagnosis is of the nosographic type “ the prognosis will be 
formulated by attributing to the patient a probability of going towards a specific 
result of the disease equal to the probability assigned to this result in the 
symptomatologic picture of the disease”. For example: 
 
“If we imagine a patient in whom, on the basis of recurring mouth and genital ulcers, the 
diagnosis of Behcet’s Syndrome has been put forward, the doctor knows that in 10-25% of 
patients affected by this disease, neurological damage exists and that (at least prior to 1970)  in 
subjects with neurological complications, mortality is 40%; he also knows that 50% of these 
patients suffer from arthropathies or actual arthritis. On the basis of the probablities deduced 
from literature, the doctor will state that this patient has a 0.10-0.25 probability of suffering a 
neuropathy and that, if neurological changes are present, he will have a 0.04-0.10 probability of 
dieing. Finally, he will be able to predict that his patient will have an approximately 0.50 
probability of suffering from problems in the joints. These prognostic judgements have an 
obvious inductive basis and constitute cases of ‘ individual predictive inference’”(35) 
 
 Physiopathological prognosis is based on the prediction that the initial 
conditions of the explanandum will occur with regularities indicated by 
physiological laws: “it is clear that since the prognosis is based on an event 
that has still to occur, it is less certain than the diagnosis; in fact, in prognostic 
judgement, a further element is added to the elements of uncertainty present in 
the diagnostic judgement, linked to the possibility that certain circumstances 
that are decisive for the course of the disease, may actually occur or not occur 
(often the backing laws that the doctor uses in formulating a prognosis are not 
referred to explicitly, so that we could say that .... elliptical prognoses are 
made)” (36). 
                                  
32 G. FEDERSPIL, Logica clinica.  I princìpi del metodo in medicina, ( Clinical Logic.), Milan, 
2004, p. 250-251. 
33 G. FEDERSPIL, op. cit. p. 253. 
34 G. FEDERSPIL, op. cit. p. 239. 
35 G. FEDERSPIL, op.cit. p. 253-254. 
36 G. FEDERSPIL, op. cit. p. 254 ss. 
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 The ex post investigation of the doctor can, on the other hand, give rise 
to the explanation. To explain a clinical case “means completely reconstructing 
the pathogenetic sequence that has occurred in a patient”.  
 
Moreover, “very few diseases have been really explained to date.  On the contrary, we can state 
that in many fields of medicine, as research progresses, an increasingly rich, articulate and 
complex causal process is developing, so that a complete explanation of morbid phenomena 
seems to become an increasingly distant objective.  On one hand, the concept of gene has 
shown itself to be much more articulate than was thought up to the last decades of the 
twentieth-century.  On the other hand, several pathogenetic sequences that were thought to 
constitute apparently unitary pathologies have been found.  Diabetes mellitus of second type, 
obesity and ischemic cardiopathy all represent examples of morbid processes considered 
unitary, that today are determined by numerous pathogenetic sequences that are very different 
from each other, so that it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the idea of a single causal 
process similar to the one introduced by the microbiological paradigm” (37). 
 
 With things in this way, it is clear that (1) ex ante probabilities 
associated to diagnosis and prognosis are not able to give any information on 
what really happened, and that (2) very often this information cannot be given 
even from the explanation itself because “very few diseases have been truly 
explained to date”. 
 In this situation, it is even pointless to ask if it is possible to know what 
would have happened if the omitted proper conduct had taken place, i.e. if a 
correct diagnosis and prognosis had been made. 
  
 
4.    Omission in medical-surgical activity and the impossibility of eliminating 
the plurality of causes.  – An initial conclusion is emerging that may appear a 
surprising novelty for those who adopted the traditional concept of omissive 
causation: very often the intervention of “other causes” cannot be excluded 
with certainty, as the Full Bench of the Supreme Court would like, when we 
wonder if the omitted proper conduct would have prevented the occurrence of 
the harmful event. 
 Let us suppose to have a patient who died from a lung tumour that was 
not resected immediately.  To assert the causal importance of the omitted 
conduct (immediate surgery) the judge would have to have proof that the 
patient would not have died if the diagnosis and surgical operation had not 
been carried out too late.  This proof, however, cannot be reached: the judge 
will never be able to demonstrate that, if immediate intervention had taken 
place, the patient would not have died from pneumonia, pulmonary embolism, 
respiratory failure, haemorrhage, myocardium infarction, arhythmia, heart 
failure, kidney failure, infection of the surgical wound or broncho-pleural 
fistulae. 
 Similarly, the judge will never be able to demonstrate that the patient 
would not have died in any case even if immediate resection of the liver or the 
gastro-intestinal tumour had occurred (up to exclude death from post-surgical 
coma, kidney failure, pulmonary embolism, cardiac arrest, haemorrhage, post-
surgical pancreatitis and other complications) or if the patient had received 
                                  
37 G. FEDERSPIL, op. cit., p. 286-287. 
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appropriate therapy for myocardium infarction following immediate 
hospitalisation. 
The reasons for the impossibility of proof must be sought in a peculiarity  
of omissive causation: the judge must not search for information about what 
really happened, but information about what would have happened if the 
omitted conduct had been carried out.  What is before the eyes of the judge, 
however, is an unmistakable and exclusively hypothetical counterfactual world 
and the information that can be deduced from the real world is wholly 
inadequate to make what would have happened clear. 
 This is a very important remark for the theory of omissive causation; it 
demonstrates that, when we talk about omitted proper conduct, it is often 
totally impossible to pose the problem of the plurality of causes: in the 
hypothetical world which the judge must deal with, information on what would 
have happened if precautionary rules had been observed cannot be traced. 
 
 
5. Ex post probabilities associated to particularistic proof necessary for 
affirming the existence of the causal relationship in a criminal trial.  – Ex post 
probabilities however are decisive in order to verify what actually happened or 
what might have happened. 
 As Richard Wright puts it: “In the dice throwing hypothetical, there are 
two possible generalization statements: ‘throwing a dice causes six spots to 
fall uppermost one-sixth of the time’ and ‘throwing a dice causes fewer than six 
spots to fall uppermost five-sixths of the time’”. The ex ante causal probabilities 
associated to these two generalizations are respectively 17% and 83%, and 
provide a strong basis for predicting what will happen or for betting that the 
second generalization is more likely to occur than the first. 
 Nevertheless, they provide no information at all on which of the two 
causal generalizations was actually instantiated on this particular occasion.  
On the other hand, if there is any particularistic evidence that a six actually fell 
uppermost, that would be evidence that the abstract result in the first causal 
generalization was instantiated and that the abstract result in the second 
causal generalization was not instantiated. There then would be a greater ex 
post causal probability that the causal law underlying the first causal 
generalization, rather than the second, was fully instantiated, despite the much 
greater ex ante causal probabilities for the second causal generalization.(38).   
 Particularistic evidence is therefore necessary for the causal 
explanation, i.e. to establish what really happened, because only this type of 
evidence can confirm or deny the instantiation of the abstract elements of an 
ex ante generalization. 
Another example – I have discussed in other papers (39) – can be useful 
in confirming the accuracy of this conclusion. X fired 99 bullets against V, Y 
fired only one, one single bullet strikes V and kills him; further to ballistic tests 
                                  
38 R. W.  WRIGHT, op. cit., p. 1052 et seq. . 
39 See F. STELLA, Verità, scienza e giustizia: le frequenze medio-basse nella successione di 
eventi (Truth, Science and Justice), in Riv. it. dir. proc. pen. 2002, p. 1239. 
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carried out on the weapons of both X and Y, thanks to the marks left on it, the 
single bullet can be identified as coming from gun Y and not from gun X. 
 No generalization exists that can explain the murder of V in terms of the 
ratio of bullets fired by X or Y or vice versa;  we can only argue a causal 
generalization which establishes that firing “a shot at someone” means killing 
him.  We could also argue a generalization of the type “the more bullets one 
fires at someone, the more likely you are to kill him”.  Those who support such 
a  generalization might even argue that a person – X -  who fires 99 bullets is 
almost certain to kill the intended victim, while a different person – Y - who 
fires only one shot is much less likely to do so.  
So, as Wright points out, this generalization seems spurious.  A causal 
generalization must be capable of being instantiated.  What particularistic 
evidence would instantiate the abstract element described as “the more bullets 
one fires”?(40). 
 The truth is that  
 
“applying standard mathematical probability rules, the ex ante causal probability  that all ninety-
nine of X’s bullets would miss V was at least .37 (.99 to the 99th power). So the ex ante causal 
probability that at least one of X’s ninety-nine bullets would hit V was at most only 63%.  There 
is insufficient data to estimate the effectiveness of Y’s shooting, which might have been highly 
effective (100%)...  In our shooting hypothetical, even if Y is presumed to be as poor a 
marksman as X, so that the ex ante causal probability that Y would kill V was at most one 
percent while the ex ante causal probability that X would kill V was at most 63%, the great 
disparity in ex ante causal probabilities tells us nothing about which possibility actually occurred 
on this particular occasion. To determine what actually occurred, we must determine whether 
the causal law underlying the causal generalization involving X or the causal law underlying the 
causal generalization involving Y was fully instantiated on this particular occasion. Only 
particularistic evidence – and ex post causal probabilities based solely on such evidence, are 
probative on the issue of instantiation”.(41) 
.  
Thus, the probabilities deriving from ballistic tests are ex post causal 
probabilities, based on particularistic evidence with a high probatory value: 
each gun has unique irregularities on the surface of the barrel and on the 
breech that make distinctive marks on each bullet that is fired.  In our 
hypothetical, the marks on the particular bullet that killed V were compared 
with those on the bullets that were fired by X and Y.  The marks on the bullets 
constitute particularistic evidence that the bullet that killed V was fired by gun Y 
and not gun X. 
The probability of error is assessed almost entirely on the basis of the 
skill of the person who carried out the comparison between the various bullets. 
 And note that even if we accept the assumption of only 80% accuracy, 
the ballistics tests on both guns in our hypothetical result in a 94% ex post 
causal probability that the bullet that killed V came from Y’s weapon, compared 
with a minimal 6% causal probability that it came from X’s. 
 Wright, who with regard to this point quotes the corresponding opinion 
of scholars of the importance of GLANVILLE WILLIAMS and JONATHAN 
COHEN, points out that 94% ex post causal probability should be sufficient to 
                                  
40 R. W. WRIGHT, op. cit., p. 1059. 
41 R. W. WRIGHT, op.cit., p. 1060. 
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justify a finding, based on the preponderance of the evidence as required in 
a civil suit, that Y and not X caused the death of V (42). 
 Wright’s reference to the rule of the civil court is important.  It allows us 
to point out the particularly high value that ex post probability associated to 
particularistic evidence must have, in a criminal suit. 
 In the legal process, scholars of applied mathematics who try to explain 
the meaning of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” in quantitative terms 
“generally require an ex post probability higher than a threshold very close to 
1” (43). 
 The recent study by FROSINI has showed that  
 
“in so far as different people can give different interpretations of the terms ‘very high 
probabilities’, ‘practical certainty’, ‘very low probability’ and such like, it would seem, in any case, 
that we must exclude the possibility of talking about ‘practical certainty’ if the probability in 
question is lower than 0.99; on the contrary, it would seem more reasonable to move this 
probability at least to 0.999...  This means, following the opinion of NEYMAN-PEARSON, that 
probability of error of the first kind (to convict an individual when he is innocent) should be 
adequately low, for example lower than 0.001 (i.e. 1 in a thousand)” (44). 
  
When the stake is very high (the guilt or innocence of the accused), the 
judgement standard –  observed FROSINI – should be based on these very ex 
post probabilities.  If the importance of the stake is very high, even in the civil 
trial practical certainty will be required, i.e. an ex post probability of over 99%; 
thus in order to attribute a DNA profile to a specific person, for the purposes of 
the legal declaration of natural paternity, according to the Italian Supreme 
Court, “a degree of probability which, with the yardstick of current scientific 
knowledge, normally exceeds 99% is necessary”  (45). For the Court of Appeal 
of Perugia, if “we reach a probability that approaches mathematical certainty 
and, moreover, if such results appear to be corroborated by the so-called 
historical proof (concerning the existence of a stable and long-lasting 
sentimental relationship between the mother of the minor and the alleged 
father, the concern of the latter during the pregnancy and birth as well as 
further relevant important circumstances), then the application for the 
recognition of natural paternity can certainly be accepted (46). According to a 
verdict of the  Court of Appeal of L’Aquila in 2002, “ if the DNA test of the 
deceased father attributes 99.96% probability of a positive result and a series 
of unequivocal positive elements are added to this (in this case, the 
relationship between the alleged  father and the mother; knowledge on the part 
of the friends and relatives of the deceased of the fact that the latter 
succeeded in having a daughter from the plaintiff through artificial 
insemination, etc...), the natural paternity of the deceased father can  be 
legally declared” (47). 
                                  
42 R. W. WRIGHT, op. cit., p. 1058 ss., 1056 ss. 
43 See D. KAYE, Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to Understand Proof Beyond Reasonable 
Doubts? in Boston U.L. Rev., 1986, p. 487-516.  
44 B. V. FROSINI, Le prove statistiche nel processo civile e nel processo penale, Milan, 2002, 
p.130. 
45 Cass. Civil sect. I, 9.6.1995 no. 6550, in Dir. fam., 1995, p. 426.  
46 Perugia Court of Appeal, 17.9.1993, in Dir. fam., 1994, p. 618 
47 L’Aquila Court of Appeal, 14.3.2002, in Giur. it., 2003, p.87 
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 It is worth adding that the case law of other countries reaches similar 
findings: for the attribution of paternity, the maximum value of ex post 
probability is 99.73% in Germany, 99.99% in the Netherlands and 99.9% in 
common law countries, in which the attribution of the DNA profile to a specific 
person, in a criminal trial, is possible when the error does not exceed 1 out of 
10,000 (ex post probability of 99.9%) (48). 
 The reference to ex post probabilities required in order to attribute a 
DNA profile to a given person is even more pertinent when we are dealing with 
the investigation on causation: in fact there is no reason in the world that can 
explain why the ex post probabilities of the individual causal propositions 
should be lower, in a criminal trial, than the ex post probabilities required for 
the attribution of paternity. 
 
 
6. Ex post probabilities associated to particularistic evidence and the 
support given to them by statistical laws with a frequency very close to 100.  – 
We must now investigate the hypotheses in which  particularistic evidence 
linked to an ex post causal explanation can be associated to an ex post 
probability “very close to 1”, i.e. of 0.999 with an error probability of 1 out of 
1,000, if the judge uses statistical laws.  Here also we must quote the opinion 
of scholars of statistics applied to the criminal trial.  FROSINI states that an 
objective ex post probability, in order to be close to 1, must derive from a 
statistical law “with a percentage coefficient very close to 100”. Only in this 
way, according to the scholar, can we reach practical certainty, i.e. an ex post 
probability approaching 100%.  And FROSINI adopts the example of the 
opinions of the Supreme Court that demands, for the causal explanation, the 
statistical law with frequency close to 100 (Baltrocchi, Di Cintio, Musto 
opinions) (49).  
On the same wave-length, among the jurists, WRIGHT, states that “an 
ex ante causal probability can represent evidence of what really happened 
only if the ex ante causal probability is so high that it practically excludes an 
alternative causal generalization, so that the potentially applicable causal 
generalization is practically equivalent to a (universal) causal law” (50). 
  I, myself, in 1975 in “Scientific laws and causal explanation in criminal 
law” agreed with HEMPEL’s theory which requires a frequency approaching 
100 precisely (51). 
 On the philosophical level, there are an infinity of quotations. For 
CARNAP a 5% frequency may offer an unsatisfactory and extremely weak ex 
post explanation, while a 97% frequency offers an adequate explanation (52); 
for HEMPEL, an adequate ex post explanation of individual events can be had 
if the inductive support, represented by the nomologic premises (statistical 
laws), is very strong, i.e. if the frequency stated by statistical law is very close 
                                  
48 B. V. FROSINI, op. cit., p. 131. 
49 B. V. FROSINI, op. cit., p.7. 
50 R. W. WRIGHT, op. cit., p. 1052, n. 278 
51 F. STELLA, Leggi scientifiche e spiegazione causale nel diritto penale, cit. p. 307. 
52 R. CARNAP, Philosophical Foundations of Physics, London,1966, p. 51 et seq. 
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to the 100% of cases: “if probability q is close to 1, a law of this type can be 
invoked to explain the occurrence of C in a particular given case in which 
conditions f occurred”.  In other words, the frequencies indicated by statistical 
law can constitute the  basis for the causal explanation with an ex post 
probability associated to the particularistic evidence only if the statistical law 
gives an overwhelming ex ante probability and it is practically certain that the 
event occurred due to the instantiation of the statistical law (53); for POPPER, 
the ex post causal explanation for an individual event is only possible if the 
explanans contains “universal laws” together with some singular statements, 
called initial conditions (54); for NAGEL, the ex post explanation is causal if the 
law contained in the explanans “is causal because the relationship formulated 
                                  
53C. HEMPEL, Philosophy of Natural Science, Englewood Cliffs, 1966 p. 106 et seq..  “It is 
sometimes said that precisely because of its inductive character, a probabilistic account does 
not explain the occurrence of an event, since the explanans does not logically preclude its 
non-occurrence. But the important, steadily expanding role that probabilistic laws and theories 
play in science and its applications, makes it preferable to view accounts based on such 
principles as affording explanations as well. Take, for example, the radioactive decay of a 
sample of one milligram polonium.  Suppose that what is left of this initial amount after 3.05 
minutes is found to have a mass that falls within the interval from 0.499 to 0.501 milligrams.  
This finding can be explained by the probabilistic law of decay for polonium; for that law, in 
combination with the principles of mathematical probability, deductively implies that given the 
huge number of atoms in a milligram of polonium, the probability of the specified outcome is 
overwhelmingly large, so that in a particular case its occurrence may be expected with 
“practical certainty”.  Or consider the explanation offered by the kinetic theory of gases for an 
empirically established generalisation called Graham’s law of diffusion.  The law states that at 
fixed temperature and pressure, the rates at which different gases in a container escape, or 
diffuse, through a thin porous wall are inversely proportional to the square roots of their 
molecular weights; (...) In view of the very large number of molecules involved, it is 
overwhelmingly probable that at any given time the actual average speeds will have values 
very close to their probability estimates and that, therefore, it is practically certain that they 
will be, like the latter, inversely proportional to the square roots of their molecular masses. In 
physical text and treatises, theoretical accounts of this probabilistic kind are indeed very widely 
referred to as explanations”. (... “The second law of thermodynamics is a statistical law, i.e. a 
law that is not always valid, but only in the majority of cases.  Let us take as an example, a 
system composed of a vessel containing gas molecules.  Let us suppose that, initially, the 
molecules are all confined by a partition to the left half of the vessel.  If we remove the 
partition, the molecules will tend to spread and to occupy both halves of the vessel.  After a 
while, (....) it is incomparably more likely that they will be distributed in more or less equal 
quantities in both parts (...) There is a probability of 1 against many millions of millions that all 
the gas molecules will be found in the same half of the vessel, but, as much as this is infinitely 
improbable, it still remains possible”; S. HAWKING, The Cambridge Lectures – Life Works, 
Dove Books,1996 p. 76-78: “For example, consider a system of gas molecules in a box…  
Suppose that initially the molecules are all confined to the left-hand side of the box by a 
partition.  If the partition is then removed, the molecules will tend to spread out and occupy 
both halves of the box.  At some later time they could, by chance, all be in the right half or all 
be back in the left half.  However, it is overwhelmingly more probable that there will be roughly 
equal numbers in the two halves…  The second law is a statistical law – that is, it does not 
hold always, just in the vast majority of cases.  The probability of all the gas molecules in our 
box being found in one half of the box at a later time is many millions of millions to one, but it 
could happen”.    
 
54 K.POPPER, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York, 1965, p. 59 et seq. 
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by it is invariable or uniform” (55); for PASQUINELLI, only “laws of causal 
succession that state the existence of an invariable and uniform relationship, 
necessary in a physical sense between the facts” can be assumed in support 
of the ex post causal explanation (56); for AGAZZI, the idea of causation is 
closely linked to that of necessity and therefore “for the very reason that it 
admits exceptions, a statistical law already indicates the absence of necessity 
and the least that can be demanded is that it should be very close to 1” (57) ; 
for MACKIE, “true universal propositions exist from which the occurrence of E 
derives, given certain additional singular premises, and the fact that the 
occurrence of C was real. That the occurrence of C is a necessary condition 
for the occurrence of E therefore means that true universal propositions exist 
from which the occurrence of C derives, given certain additional, singular 
premises” (58). 
 What should in any case guide the choice of the statistical laws to be 
inserted in the explanans? 
 A question of this type can only be resolved if we look at the context in 
which the practical action takes place: for the practical action – says 
HEMPEL – and for the decisions to be adopted if the probabilistic 
hypotheticals are to be accepted or rejected, on the basis of statistics 
concerning the observed frequencies, there is the need for appropriate 
criteria.  
 
“The stringency of the chosen standards will normally vary with the context (...). Broadly 
speaking it will depend on the importance which is attached, in the given context, to avoiding 
two kinds of errors that might be made: rejecting the hypothesis under test, although if it is true; 
and accepting it although it is false. The importance of this point is particularly clear when the 
acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis is to serve as a basis for the practical action.  Thus, if 
the hypothesis concerns the probable effectiveness and safety of a new vaccine, then the 
decision about its acceptance will have to take into account not only how well the statistical tests 
results accord with the probabilities specified by the hypothesis, but also how serious would be 
the consequences of accepting the hypothesis and acting on it (i.e.by inoculating children with 
the vaccine) when in fact it is false” (59). 
 
 This step by Hempel is really crucial; the decisions to be adopted, on 
the basis of probabilities depend on the context: if the hypothesis of the 
existence of the causal relashionship is based on “medium or low” 
probabilities, and results to be false, the consequences are devastating 
(conviction of the innocent), in some way similar to those of inoculation of the 
vaccine.  This is why the ex ante probability must be close to 100; only such a 
probability guarantees that the probability of an error of the first kind (to convict 
an individual when he is innocent) is adequately low, i.e. lower than 0.001 and 
                                  
55 E. NAGEL, The Structure of Science, London, 1971, p. 80 et seq. 
56 PASQUINELLI, Nuovi principi di epistemologia, Milan, 1984, repr. 1987, Bologna, p. 122 et 
seq. 
57 E. AGAZZI, La spiegazione causale degli eventi individuali (o singoli), in Riv. it. dir. proc. 
pen., 1999, p. 400 et seq. 
58 J. MACKIE, The Cement of the Universe, New York, 1980, p. 59 et seq. 
59 C. HEMPEL, op. cit., p. 65. 
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that i.e. the ex post probabilities linked to the particularistic evidence allow at 
the most an error of 1 out of 1000 (60).  
 
 
7.   Ex post probability and the instantiation of the  covering law.  Summing up, 
we can state that the singular causal proposition, linked to particularistic 
evidence, must be matched, in the criminal trial, by an ex post probability of 
99.9% (FROSINI observes however that, in calculating these ex post 
probabilities, some errors may be concealed due to theoretical bias that are 
not included in the coefficient of confidence and that therefore “a real defence, 
with respect to errors of the first kind, is never higher than 99%” and “a 
calculated probability of 99% should be assessed cautionally at around 95%) 
(61). 
 To arrive at an explanation that has such a high degree of ex post 
probability, particularistic evidence must constitute the instantiation of a causal 
law, i.e. of a universal law, or of a statistical law with a frequency very close to 
100.  WRIGHT dedicates many pages to demonstrating that the particularistic 
evidence of the causal relationship consists “in the complete and actual 
instantiation, in a particular case, of a causal generalization”:  
 
“In order to prove that a specific condition was the cause of a particular occurrence, we must 
obviously establish that both the condition and the event actually occurred and that some 
credible causal generalization links conditions of that type to events of that type.  The evidence 
will be corroborated by the circumstance that the other known conditions, that are part of the 
causal generalization, also occurred.  On the other hand, there will be no evidence of causation 
if we establish that any one of the conditions requested did not occur. Finally, we must 
distinguish between all applicable causal generalizations alternatively, disputing them or raising 
substantial doubts on the instantiation of one or more of the conditions required by the 




8.    Medical science, the paradigm of microbiology and the use of statistical 
laws for which “given A, B almost necessarily follows ”.  – These are the 
premises that should constitute the basis of the new consensus on liability for 
the omitted prevention of the event in medical-surgical activity: the 
counterfactual, aimed at establishing what would have occurred if the omitted 
conduct had been carried out, must demonstrate that the conduct would have 
made it possible to offer particularistic evidence linked to the instantiation of a 
universal law or of a statistical law with a frequency very close to 100.  It is on 
the very ground of medical-surgical activity, in fact, that the considerations 
made up to now, on the instantiation of a universal or statistical causal law 
with a frequency very close to 100, find a highly convincing confirmation. 
 The appeal for the need to make use, in the ex post reconstruction of 
what would have occurred if the omitted conduct had taken place, of the “most 
up-to-date medical-legal criteriology” comes from the United States.  The 
adjective “most up-to-date” assumes a “less up-to-date” criteriology, i.e. that 
                                  
60 B. V.FROSINI, op. cit., p. 7 et seq. 
61 B. V. FROSINI, op. cit., p. 131. 
62 R. W. WRIGHT, op. cit., p. 140 et seq. 
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has not been updated: it is the old criteriology based on the idea that forensic 
doctors must ascertain not the necessary condition, but the “capability” of a 
substance or a conduct to produce a certain damage, i.e. in short ex ante 
probabilities. 
 In Italy, this old criteriology, as I showed in “Justice and Modernity”, has 
been definitely discredited and has been eliminated both by the intervention of 
the Full Bench of the Supreme Court and by recent contributions of the current 
leaders of the forensic medicine movement, BARNI and FIORI: the forensic 
doctor duty is to ascert the necessary condition (63).  The new criteriology – the 
more up-to-date one – however, has not yet been processed by forensic 
medicine scholars; and it is for this reason that the basic indications must be 
sought in the works of medical epistemology scholars, and first of all in the 
very recent work of FEDERSPIL “Clinical Logic”. 
  
“If we reflect on current medical knowledge, it is easy to establish that in pathology the ideal of 
cause as a necessary condition is still today fundamental (64); and it became fundamental  
when microbiology changed the paradigm of pathology. While for pre-Pasteurian medicine, an 
almost infinite series of different factors should be the  cause of a disease, with the birth of 
microbiology and with the coding of Koch postulates – i.e. 1) it must be possible to 
demonstrate the micro-organism in every case of that specific disease; 2) the micro-organism 
must be cultivated in a pure culture; 3) inoculation of the micro-organism into the culture must 
reproduce the diseases in susceptible animals; 4) the micro-organism must be re-obtained from 
the inoculated animals – we have gone on to a different theoretical definition; causation became 
necessary since the finding of a specific micro-organism constituted the conditio sine qua non 
for the development of an infectious disease” (65). 
 
The example of the paradigm of microbiology is fitting: it allows the 
doctor and pathologist to go beyond the formulation of hypotheses or 
diagnostic conjectures, and to provide true aetiological diagnoses, since they 
are founded on controlled hypotheses. FEDERSPIL says again: “imagine a 
subject who has been in contact with a cholera patient and who has worrying 
symptoms...  The symptoms will be attributed to the cholera vibrio.  This 
situation can actually be checked, by identifying the vibrio in the faeces and 
possibly by injecting it into an animal” (66). 
The Italian epidemiologist COMBA offers similar indications about the 
paradigm of microbiology:  
 
“Initially, epidemiologists working on transmittable pathologies relied on the paradigm of 
microbiology that gave them a scheme of interpretation.  In order to say that a micro-organism 
caused a disease, it was necessary to check that the organism had been re-found in all cases of 
the disease, it had to be isolated in the patients, cultivated on a Petri dish, then reinoculated in a 
laboratory animal, to reproduce the disease.  This was the precise scheme of causation, that 
had given excellent results from the end of the last century until after the war” (67). 
                                  
63 M. BARNI, Consulenza medico-legale e responsabilità medica, Milan, 2002, p. 57 et seq.; A. 
FIORI, Il nesso causale e la medicina legale: un chiarimento indifferibile, in Riv. it. med. leg. 
2002, p. 247 et seq. 
64 G.FEDERSPIL, Clinical Logic, cit., p. 221, 233. 
65 G.FEDERSPIL, op. loc. citt. 
66 G. FEDERSPIL, I fondamenti del metodo in medicina clinica e sperimentale (The 
Foundations of method in clinical and experimental medicine), Padua, 1980, p. 79, quoted in 
F. STELLA, Giustizia e  modernità, cit., p. 418. 
67 Court of Venice, 22.10.2001, cit. hearing 1st July, 1998, p. 142-143. 
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And if the paradigm of microbiology cannot be used? 
 When asked this question the only thing we can do is to question 
medicine again, to understand if it has covering laws which, disregarding 
intermediate causal links, connect the “initial” and the “final” event even if they 
are not continuous in time and not contiguous in space. 
Once again it is FEDERSPIL who gives us the answer: within the 
sphere of medical knowledge, these laws, used in cases of “simple, linear 
causation” make it possible to identify the cause of a morbid phenomenon in 
“a very powerful external event, that produces constantly or almost 
constantly specific consequences in the organism: a serious gun-shot wound, 
the action of yersinia pestis, the action of amanita phalloides, etc”.  In certain 
cases, then in medicine, a covering law indicates that a certain cause always 
produces a specific effect, and that that effect is caused by that cause and 
only by that cause (thus the problem of the plurality of causes disappears): 
“this causal mode can be simplified by what happens after a burn: a very 
intense source of heat always produces an immediate necrosis of the tissues 
and that type of necrosis, that appears in a short time, is practically only 
produced by burns”: In short in order to identify the cause, in medicine 
universal laws can be used (“given A, B necessarily follows”) together with 
almost universal statistical laws (“given A, B almost necessarily follows”). 
These kind of laws, introduced into the explanans together with the initial 
conditions, make it possible to identify the necessary condition when 
instantiation is not demonstrated in the individual case. 
FEDERSPIL is very clear on this point:  
 
“Causal laws do not only state the existence of an invariable connection of events, but they are 
laws of succession, in the sense that they link events that take place at different times.  
Examples of these laws can be considered assertions of this type: ‘the application of a stress to 
an organism always releases adrenocortical hormones’, or ‘the Toh secretion of hypophysis 
stimulates the release of hormones by the thyroid’.  These laws are in fact called universal laws 
and for a long time have represented the ideal model of scientific laws. However, not all 
scientific laws have this universal form. In fact, other laws exist that are called probabilistic or 
statistical, which state that in X% of cases A is followed by B: for example, the assertion 
‘rheumatic cardiopathy is followed in X% of cases by a mitral stenosis’” (68).  
 
 The necessary condition for a pathological event in medicine can be 
identified, therefore, by proving that a statistical law was instantiated in the 
individual case which, as we have seen, according to FEDERSPIL (and other 
scholars of medical epistemology), must be almost universal, i.e. a law for 
which “given A, B almost necessarily follows” (69). 
In this way the picture is completed: for medicine also we can say that 
the ex post causal explanation must constitute the instantiation of a universal 
causal law or of a statistical law close to 100: only in this way will it be 
possible to obtain the particularistic proof to which ex post probabilities of 
around 99.9% are associated. 
 
                                  
68 G. FEDERSPIL, Logica clinica, cit., p. 216 et seq 
69 G. FEDERSPIL, op. ult. cit., p. 222 et seq 
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 9.    Counterfactuals and the “similar world”.  – The considerations above, 
concerning the ex ante probabilities, the ex post probabilities associated to 
particularistic proof, the support offered to the latter by universal laws or by 
statistical laws with a frequency very close to 100, concern commissive 
causation, but must also be extended to omissive causation.. 
Let me introduce a short reflection on counterfactuals to see what I 
mean. 
According to the opinion received in the most refined Italian version – 
i.e. the one developed by PALIERO in the critical analysis of my paper on 
omission as a static condition: omissive causation is characterised by a 
“double hypothetical nature” (70) – in case of omission, the judge must 
establish what would have happened if the proper omitted conduct had been 
performed: from this point of view, this has nothing to do with commissive 
causation, within the sphere of which the judge asks himself if an event in the 
real world, that has already occurred hic et nunc, as the development of a 
material causal course, subsumible under pertinent covering laws, would have 
occurred without the action. 
To question oneself about “what would have happened” means 
seeking the conditions and events of a hypothetical world.  But how must this 
world be built?  At the discretion of the judge or on the basis of well identified 
and predefined indications that are binding for him? 
In order to realise the great practical importance of these questions, we 
just have to think about the problem of the plurality of causes in case of 
omissions. The sure exclusion of the intervention of other causes is a 
requirement indicated by studies on logic, by the philosophy of science and 
now by the Full Bench of the Supreme Court as a basic requisite in 
ascertaining the causal relationship, both on the ground of commissive 
causation and on that of omissive causation. But the procedural verification, 
abstractly possible when the judicial investigation concerns the real world, 
appears almost always, or very often, impossible to propose when the judge 
enters a hypothetical world. 
In establishing “what would have happened” in this type of world, we 
come up against an alternative: we can think that, if the omitted conduct had 
taken place, “everything would have gone well”, but we can also imagine 
that, without the omission “everything would have gone equally badly”. 
                                  
70 According to C.E. PALIERO, “Stella is right and, in my opinion, the traditional doctrine 
wrong: it should be denied that the two heuristic models of conditionalistic form (omissive and 
commissive) are different because one has a hypothetical structure and the other an empirical-
factual structure...  However, I cannot agree fully with Stella’s critique, denying categorically 
with him that the two causal (commissive and omissive) paradigms are different from any point 
of view.....  In the conditionalistic formula, the heuristic model of omissive causation  differs 
from that of active causation, characterising itself, as we say, as a counterfactual in the second 
degree ....  The formula of omissive causation is doubly hypothetical” (C.E.PALIERO, La 
causalità dell’omissione: formule concettuali e paradigmi prasseologici, in Riv. it. med. leg., 
1992, p. 839 et seq.).  PALIERO is right, and I agree without doubt with his idea of second 
degree counterfactuals.  
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So, in order to state the causal relevance of the omitted conduct, the 
judge should prove that, without it, “everything would have gone well”; but what 
could this proof be? 
If we exclude the use of fantasy and imagination, the probatory 
reference point can only be the real world; but the real world actually offers, 
with an inexhaustible richness, the picture of possible interventions of other 
causes.  This is where the point is: if a certain type of event can be the result 
of the realization of different causal propositions, how will the judge be able to 
state that “everything would have gone well” in the absence of the omission?  
How will he be able to affirm that an event of a certain type would not have 
occurred, had the proper conduct been adopted? 
Numerous “cases” can be found in the files of the Italian criminal  
jurisprudence in which causation in criminal omissions is established, even 
though the judge finds it impossible to prove that no other causes exist: thus 
late diagnoses and late surgical operations are considered the cause of the 
event despite the fact that sound scientific research, as we have already 
affirmed (see par. 3) shows high mortality rates, due to the most disparate 
complications that occur in the case of immediate diagnosis and operations or 
admission to hospital. 
Here it is clear that the judge did not even raise the problem of the sure 
exclusion of other causes and, what counts more, he could not have raised it if 
he had wanted to reach a verdict, because he would have found himself with 
impossible evidence: in a hypothetical world, it is only with the imagination that 
one can fill the vacuum of having “forgotten” mortality rates recorded in the real 
world. 
It is at this point that we need to rethink the topic of counterfactuals in 
omissive causation hypotheses also. 
The counterfactual world is, by definition, a hypothetical world; but there 
are many hypothetical worlds, so we are forced to identify the counterfactual 
world to which the judicial investigation must refer.  According to the very 
important work of DAVID LEWIS – a reference point for all investigations into 
counterfactuals (71) - in identifying the possible world one must abandon 
fantasy and construct the most adequate “similar world”. 
If this, as it seems to me, is the only feasible approach, the conditions 
and events that occur in the real world must be introduced into the similar 
world; and this is so because in the real world, due to the widest range of 
complications, it happens that immediate diagnoses, surgical operations and 
hospitalisation do not succeed in preventing the harmful event.  This should be 
taken into account when constructing the similar world.  Similarly, in this 
construction, reference must be made to the impossibility of ex ante 
probabilities to give us information about what would have happened if the 
omitted conduct had occurred, as reference must also be made to the high 
level of ex post probability (99.9%), that can be reached only by using 
statistical laws with frequencies very close to 100.  In other words, the singular 
                                  
71 LEWIS, Counterfactuals, Oxford, 1973; p. 72-77.  For a criticism of the approach of the 
“similar world” by LEWIS, see, KIM, Causes and Counterfactuals, in J. Phil., 1973, p. 570 et 
seq. reprinted in Causation and Conditionals, Oxford, 1975, p. 192 et seq. 
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causal proposition on what would have happened in the absence of omission 
must be accompanied by the same very high ex post probabilities requested 
for commissive causation. 
 
 
10.   Manipulation and emptying of the content of the notion of logical 
probability or rational credibility operated by the Italian case law. – The 
concept of logical probability or rational probability has been deeply distorted 
and unduly manipulated by numerous criminal judges who have used it (72).   
This was a notion that made its appearance in Italian criminal law 
language with my work of 1975: developing the analysis of CARNAP, I 
emphasized the need to distinguish statistical probability, as a scientific 
concept that depends on empirical research, from logical probability that is 
particularly useful in propositions that concern the laws of science.  I pointed 
out then that “when we speak of statistical hypotheses, we refer to hypotheses 
that express a quantitative relationship between kinds of repeatable events; 
when we speak of scientific hypotheses more or less logically likely, we 
want, on the other hand, to refer to universal or statistical hypotheses, that 
enjoy varying degrees of  confirmation, and that therefore are “rationally 
credible” (73).  
Logical probability or rational probability therefore coincided, in the 
thought of CARNAP and myself, with the degree of confirmation of a law 
(scientific hypothesis) offered by its own theoretical support and by controls 
consisting in observation and experiment, controls that must be numerous and 
heterogeneous (74). 
In a similar meaning, I referred the expression “logical probability” to 
singular causal statements: I emphasized that the singular statement “without 
the conduct of the agent, the event would not have occurred” must be highly 
likely or rationally credible in the sense that it must be founded on universal or 
pertinent statistical laws and on proof that the “relative initial conditions” 
occurred, i.e., in short, on the demonstrated instantiation, in the case 
considered by the judge, of a universal causal law or of a statistical law with an 
“almost 100” frequency (75). 
But the judges’ opinions reflected many misunderstandings and 
undergone several manipulations: the notion of logical probability or rational 
credibility breaks away from its original meaning, because the reference to the 
                                  
72 See F. STELLA, Fallacia ed anarchia metodologica in tema di causalità, in Riv. it. dir. proc. 
pen. 2004, p. 30 et seq.. 
73 F. STELLA, Leggi scientifiche, cit., p. 225. 
74 F. STELLA, op.ult. cit., p. 227.  CARNAP was very clear and explicit: logical probability is not 
like statistical probability “a factual statement expressed in the language of science”, i.e. “an 
empirical statement”, but a statement according to which “given certain observations and a 
hypothesis (subform.... of a group of laws)”, we obtain “the degree of confirmation of h on the 
basis of l”.  In this way, a ” statement on a logical relationship between the evidence and the 
hypothesis considered” is made.  CARNAP pointed out that it is not possible to state that a law 
of science has a higher or lower logical probability unless we specify “compared to such and 
such evidence”, i.e. to the evidence composed of controls carried out through observation 
and experiment.  CARNAP, op. cit., p. 52 et seq.. 
75 F. STELLA, op.ult.cit, p. 316 et seq. 
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degree of confirmation of scientific laws, composed of their empirical controls 
disappears, as does the reference to the ex post probabilities associated to 
particularistic proof, with reference to an universal causal law or to a statistical 
law with probability very close to 100 (76 ). 
Thus logical probability becomes a notion “hanging in a vacuum”, the 
contents of which are filled by the personal and unquestionable opinion of the 
individual judge: every proposition becomes reasonably credible or logically 
probable if it appears such to the judge since it is “released from its bases”, 
necessarily composed of the reference to the controls of scientific laws and  by 
particularistic proof, consisting in the verification that scientific law was 
instantiated in the particular occasion examined by the judge. 
Thus both science and the ex post probabilities that must be associated 
to particularistic proof disappear from the scene: the inscrutable subjective 
evaluation of the judge remains, in all its “sovereignty”, an expression of the 
dictum “auctoritas, non veritas facit judicium” (authority, not truth informs the 
judgement). 
In my opinion, these explanations are unavoidable because the 
conclusions reached on ex post probabilities of 99.9% (i.e. that they must, by 
the very nature of things, be based on the instantiation of causal laws or 
statistical laws with frequency close to 100) will be inevitably disattended as 
long as our case law does not realize that logical probability or rational 
credibility does not constitute a concept, the meaning of which can be 
“invented” by the judge. On the contrary, its logical and epistemological roots 
have been identified with absolute clarity. And it is this clarity that makes it 
possible to state that only the singular causal proposition which, ex post, has a 
“statistical” probability of no lower than 99%, deriving from the very high 
frequency, very close to 100, of the pertinent statistical law, has a high level of 
logical probability or rational credibility.   
Obviously, this applies both to commissive and omissive causation.  We 
should also add that, in the sphere of omissive causation, logical probability or 
rational credibility will not be able to receive an objective assessment when, in 
the hypothetical world evoked by the counterfactual, proof based on scientific 
laws and available evidence of that which would have happened if the proper 
omitted conduct had taken place, is not possible (77). 
 
 
11.    Difficulties in forming the new consensus: some opinions delivered  by 
the Supreme Court.  – Going on now to instantiation of the judicial experience, 
let us try to understand what has happened in Italian Supreme Court criminal 
case law, especially in recent years (i.e. the years after 2000). 
An initial group of sentences did actually follow the Full Bench in 
considering the ex ante probabilities incapable of giving any information on 
what would have happened in the case of “immediate intervention”, but 
unfortunately ex ante probabilities are replaced with the “vacuum of the 
                                  
76 See F. STELLA, Fallacia ed anarchia metodologica in tema di causalità (Fallacy and  
metodologic anarchy about causation), cit. p. 30 et seq. 
77 See retro, par. 4. 
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subjective and uncontrollable belief of the judge about what “would have 
happened”. 
 Let us briefly examine the main 2002-2003 sentences which illustrate 
this point of view. 
 
1) First case (Orlando case) (78). 
 
 A doctor fails, negligently, to diagnose a tumour of the intestines in a 
patient admitted to hospital; due to the failure to make the diagnosis, the 
patient does not undergo an immediate surgical operation that is carried out 
during a second period in hospital, just over three months later after the first 
visit. The metastases, that were not ascertained with certainty at the time of 
the first visit, spread rapidly in the months immediately preceding the excision 
operation and despite this the patient survived for more than nine months. 
The conviction of the doctor, issued by the district Court and confirmed 
by the Court of Appeal, was also confirmed by the Supreme Court, Penal Sect. 
IV, with a verdict that has some peculiarities. The Court clearly dismisses the 
criterion of ex ante probability, quantified by the trial judges at 50% probability 
of survival at 3 or 5 years in the case of immediate intervention: for the 
Supreme Court, the ex ante probability amounts here to “an increase in risk” 
and shows “the impossibility, due to the improper omissive causation, of 
identifying with certainty the omitted conditioning factor which, if carried out, 
would have prevented the occurrence of the event”. The Court observed 
conclusively that there is no judge who would sentence a person by stating 
that the  same “had probably committed the crime”. 
At this point, one would have expected the reversal of the sentence; but 
the judicial resources of judges who wanted a conviction at all costs are 
infinite, and thus the Supreme Court confirmed the previous sentence by 
manipulating and misunderstanding  the concept of logical probability I talked 
about.  This was in fact the conclusion of the Court: “if the disease had been 
diagnosed and treated immediately, even in the least favourable hypothesis, it 
would have allowed the patient to survive during a period of time quantifiable in 
years”. 
It makes me feel like saying: with its language, the Court creates an 
non-existing reality! One does not have to be an expert in the philosophy of 
language and does not even have to consult studies in logic to realize that 
here we are faced by a radical absence of rational credibility considered by the 
judges as legality. If the probability of a frequentist type of survival of as much 
as 3 or 5 years, in the case of immediate intervention, was – as the Court 
admitted – 50%, how can it be logically affirmed that the patient would 
definitely have survived longer if the doctor had made the omitted diagnosis at 
the first visit? 
It is a real shame that the Court followed this path.  It is true that a 
fundamental role in the causal investigation must be assigned – as the Court 
recognizes - to the ex post investigation based on the evidence available 
concerning the individual case, but it is equally true that only the ex post 
                                  
78 Cass. crim. sect. IV, 10.6.2002, in Riv. pen., 2002, p. 671 et seq. 
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investigation should tell us, on the basis of the acquisitions of medical science, 
what are the reasons for affirming that the case of the patient who underwent 
excision operations does not fall within 50% of the cases of patients to whom 
an immediate operation did not guarantee a survival of as much as 3 or 5 
years. 
The roots of this distortion of the concept of logical probability must 
however be sought in the premises from which the Judge moves: “frequently 
universal scientific laws or simply statistical laws suitable for solving the case 
brought to the examination of the judge do not exist and sometimes – as 
subsequent research confirms – are false – therefore the judge is obliged to 
resort to simple rules of empirical rationality, as long as they are plausible” (79). 
Simple rules of empirical rationality with undefined content and 
detached from the laws of science would therefore represent an “expedient” 
used by the Supreme Court to confirm the conviction. 
It is in this way that the process of forming the consensus on the new 
way of understanding omissive causation was unexpectedly blocked. 
 
2) Second case (Albissini case) (80). 
 
 With a sentence following the teachings of the Full Bench of 10.7.2002, 
the IV pen. sect. of the Supreme Court confirmed the jail sentence of a doctor 
who had omitted to describe, in the radiological report on the thorax, the 
presence of an oval opacity of medium intensity, measuring approximately 1-
1.5 cm, which later turned out to be a neoplastic pulmonary formation (after 
about one and a half years the measurements were approximately 4 cm.). By 
not suggesting further and more detailed investigations, even of a tomographic 
and stratigraphic type, the doctor was supposed to have prevented early 
diagnosis of the disease and the implementation of immediate surgical 
operations, thus causing the death of the patient three years later, following 
the formation of brain and liver metastases. 
The Court so held: the diagnosis of the pulmonary pathology, if and as 
made at the time the x-ray was executed, “would quite probably have allowed 
- resorting to immediate surgical and therapeutic remedies, such as pulmonary 
resection - a survival of 5 years, greater therefore compared with that of 3 
years which actually happened”.  The expression “quite probably” – continues 
the Court – also fully satisfies the demand of the result of the counterfactual: it 
is in fact “ a rule of experience, as well as a scientific rule, that the efficacy of a 
tumoral diagnosis, for the purposes of longer survival, can be linked directly to 
its immediacy and precocity”. Longer survival would have been statistically 
indicated by the board of experts “in 48% of cases with reference to a period of 
time of as much as 5 years”. 
We are dealing again with ex ante probabilities: this is in short the 
criterion that supports the counterfactual, indicating how things would have 
gone in the event of immediate intervention.  And yet, the same Court had 
expressed its agreement with the teaching of the Full Bench, according to 
                                  
79 See  F. STELLA, op. cit., p. 29 et seq. 
80 Cass. pen. sect.IV, 15.11.2002, n. 38334, in Riv. pen. 2003, p. 110. 
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which “it is not allowed to deduce automatically from the  probability expressed 
by the statistical law confirmation or refutation of the prosecutor hypothesis on 
the existence of the causal relashionship”. 
In fact the ex post investigation was carried out and it did show up 
metastases, first in the brain and then in the liver, that led to the patient’s 
death; but the problem was to identify the ex post probabilities relating to 
survival for more than three years, in the hypothesis in which surgical 
intervention had been immediate, with reference to mortality rates in 
immediate operations and to the demonstrated irrelevance of the size of the 
nodule of 1-1.5 cm. compared with the nodule of 3 cm and more (81). The 
opinion has nothing to say about these probabilities and cannot do better than 
refer to the 48% of ex ante probability. 
 When all is said and done, the Supreme Court does not move very far 
from the less recent orientation for which “even only small probabilities of 
success” (sect. IV. no. 4320/83), “serious and appreciable probabilities of 
success” also represented by 30% (sect. IV, no. 371/92), “the high level of 
possibility” consisting in 75% probability of survival (sect. IV, no. 1126/2000) 
are sufficient. 
 Here the marks left by the Orlando sentence are clearly visible: it does 
not matter that the ex ante probabilities of survival at 5 years (therefore higher 
than the actual survival of 3 years) was 48%: the arguments of the District 
Court appear “completely reasonable, rigorously anchored to the trial findings”, 
logically explained by “the proclaimed deterioration of the neoplastic pathology 
towards processes of gradual metastatisation and therefore towards the fall in 
the vital balances of the organism”. 
 As we can see, this opinion too does not give us any information on the 
reasons why the patient should not fall within the 52% of cases that would not 
have survived as long as 5 years in any case even in the case of an immediate 
operation. In those 52% of cases, metastases constitute a normal evolution of 
the tumoral disease.  
 
3)  Third case (Amato case) (82) 
 
 Again, in the period following the Franzese sentence, the IV penal 
section of the Supreme Court confirmed the conviction of the assistant 
surgeon who was accused of failing to issue an immediate diagnosis of a 
testicular pathology (twisting of the testicle) from which a patient was suffering, 
wrongly diagnosing colic in the right kidney, without prescribing any 
appropriate instrumental tests and without submitting the patient to an 
immediate surgical operation. 
    The district Court sentence referred to by the Supreme Court, stated 
that, at the time of the visit “there was still an approximately 40% possibility 
that the surgical operation would have been successful”. But, in the opinion of 
the Supreme Court, this circumstance was irrelevant, given that “the harmful 
event took place -. with a causal link that was considered unavoidable and was 
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82 Cass. Pen. sect.IV., 22.11.2002, no. 39637, in Riv. pen., 2003, p. 110 ss. 
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ascertained with certainty – due to the wrong diagnosis, failure to ascertain the 
pathology and the lack of the order to proceed with further, necessary tests”. 
Once again, the Court forgets that logic and science are not optionals: if 
ex ante probabilities are 40%, how can it be affirmed that the causal 
relationship was proven with certainty? 
 Of all the sentences considered, this is surely the most peculiar due to 
the obvious incompatibility showed by two propositions with an antithetical 
meaning: if there were 60 ex ante probabilities that an immediate surgical 
operation would not have been successful, the least we could expect from a 
conviction was an explanation of why, on the basis of the evidence available 
ex post, the considered case should  fall within the 40% of success of the 
immediate operation.    
Once again, we can see the far-reaching effect of the Orlando verdict: 
recourse to ex ante probabilities and to science is wrong and must be replaced 
with no better identified criteria of empirical rationality or with no better defined 
generalizations of common sense. 
 
 
4) Fourth case (Guida Case) (83). 
 
 This is, perhaps, the most clamorous breach of the law by the Supreme 
Court. 
A patient suffering from a psychotic depressive syndrome was admitted 
to a clinic and  committed suicide by jumping out of a window in a place 
outside the clinic, after obtaining the permission of her doctor to leave the clinic 
with a person to accompany her.  The latter was not informed about the mental 
state of the patient nor about her previous attempts to commit suicide by 
jumping out of a window.     
The Supreme Court confirms the conviction. This sentence is a 
paradigmatic case of an only apparent motivation: not only did it state the 
commissive causation relationship linked to the permission to leave the clinic 
in a circumstance of “increased risk” but, from the point of view of omissive 
causation, it did not utter a word about a fundamental circumstance, pointed 
out by the defence on appeal: according to the Prosecutor’s psychiatric expert, 
there was “the same probability that the woman would have committed 
suicide inside the clinic” perhaps “by hanging herself from the toilet shutter 
box....The depressed patient is one of the most difficult patients to treat, 
because suicide is possible even when they are within the hospital system, 
despite all the precautions that are taken. For example, it has even happened 
that a brother, who was the only relative, was asked to stay in hospital with a 
patient during the most intense period of her depression, to help look after this 
person.  Then, when the drugs started working, this person was less 
depressed and was given a minimum amount of freedom.  On the day she 
committed suicide. Her brother had been with her from 2 o’clock in the 
                                  
83 Cass. Crim. sect. IV ., 6.11.2003, no. 1442, in Cass. Pen., 2004, with a note by M. Zanchetti. 
Tra l’incudine e il martello. La responsabilità penale dello psichiatra per i suicidio della 
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afternoon until 7 o’clock in the evening.  At 7 o’clock it was dinner time and all 
the relatives left: the woman said ‘I am going to the toilet for a minute’, at 7.15 
she had not come out, at 7.20 they went into the toilet and found her hanging 
from the toilet shutter box.  This situation was unforeseeable, not expected and 
completely without warning....  So, sometimes the depressed patient may carry 
out self-harming gestures in a completely unpredictable way and without 
there being any possibility for the staff to intervene”. 
The opinion of the Prosecution expert was fully confirmed by psychiatric 
science: “according to psychiatry, patients who really intend killing themselves 
will succeed in doing so.  No amount of physical containment, careful 
observation and clinical ability can stop a patient who is really determined to 
kill itself.  One of these patients was placed in an isolation room with nothing 
but a mattress.  All his clothes and his possessions were removed and he was 
checked regularly every fifteen minutes.  In the space between controls and 
every quarter of an hour, the patient started jumping on the mattress with such 
force that he managed to bang his head against the ceiling, until he broke his 
neck” (84). 
 Auctoritas, non veritas, non lex facit judicium: (authority, not truth, not 
law informs the judgement) as ancient Roman law put it: this is the most kind 
comment one can make at the opinion of the Supreme Court.  An authority that 
sees in the search for the truth not the duty of the criminal trial, but an 
academic whim; and an authority that puts itself above the law and the same 
Constitution: even the constitutional principle on the right to defend oneself can 
be considered an academic whim! 
Obviously, these “axioms” must in some way be hidden, but how can 
they be hidden? Nothing is easier: with reference to the empty formula of 
logical probability or rational credibility, understood as probability and 
credibility considered by the judge according to his inscrutable opinion.  The 
ghost of the Orlando is still hanging around; and in fact, for the Supreme Court, 
in the Guida case, “the judgement of responsibility can and must be given 
when ..... the finding that the incriminating conduct was a necessary condition 
of the harmful event with a high degree of rational probability or logical 
credibility is justified and procedurally certain”. 
 A further remark has to be made: according to the jurisprudence Review 
of the Supreme Court, issued by the Office of the Digest of Case Law of the 
Supreme Court of Cassazione, the Guida opinion represents “a particular case 
of deviation from the dictum of the Full Bench”, characterised only by “a formal 
deference to the teaching of the quoted Franzese pronouncement” (85). We 
have here therefore the most authoritative confirmation of the existence of a 
trend which, in open rebellion against the Full Bench, acknowleges the 
“emptiness” of the subjective and uncontrollable opinion of the judge  in 
establishing, in cases of omissive causation, “what would have happened”.  
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12. The new consensus and the opinions of the Supreme Court anchored to 
statistical laws with frequencies close to 100 and to particularistic proof 
associated to ex post probability of 99.9%.  –This trend is however opposed by 
another: the Supreme Court opinions, held by penal section IV, consider the 
finding unjustified when, on the basis of the laws of medical science, the judge 
cannot affirm that, if the omitted conduct had taken place, a statistical law with 
a frequency close to 100 would not have been instantiated. 
Let us look briefly at these sentences. 
 
1) First case (Baltrocchi case) (86). 
 
 Baltrocchi was a doctor on duty at the emergency department of a 
hospital.  A patient had felt ill and the doctor had diagnosed chronic bronchitis 
and a hypertensive crisis in a patient who was known to have been 
hospitalised on previous occasions, to have suffered a myocardial infarction 
and to be undergoing pharmacological therapy. Following the diagnosis, the  
doctor considered that is was not necessary to admit the patient and sent him 
home, prescribing aerosol therapy and a visit to a specialist to be made the 
following day.  After returning home, the patient died the same night.  The 
doctor at the emergency department was prosecuted for not having 
hospitalised and therefore for not having kept the patient under observation, 
even though the haemogas test had shown hypoxia, hypercapnia and 
metabolic alkalosis, so that after being sent home the patient was left without 
any therapy to prevent and cope with the cardio-respiratory crisis from which 
he died.  The district Court acquitted the doctor, holding that there were no 
elements that allowed the judges to state, with a sufficient degree of certainty, 
the causal relationship between the death and the alleged omissive conduct.  
Doubts remained about the suitability of the alternative hypothetical treatments 
to prevent the death of the patient, or, in any case, to decrease the danger of 
death at a relevant percentage.  The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, 
delivered its reversing opinion based on the remark that ex ante probabilities of 
survival, in the case of immediate treatment, were lower than 50%, but were 
not irrelevant, even if very limited.  According to the district Court, the causal 
relationship between the omissive conduct and the fatal event could be 
affirmed only if the omitted conduct had serious and appreciable possibilities of 
success.  The Supreme Court, crim. sec. IV, reversed holding that ex ante 
probabilities lower than 50% do not give any information on what really 
happened and that, in the case at hand, it was impossible to exclude that the 
event would have occurred even if the omitted proper conduct had been 
carried out. Ex ante probabilities of 50% and 28% (on which the experts 
agreed in reconstructing the two different hypotheticals) “are a long way from 
being ..... ‘close to 100’, as required by science, logic and as, consequently, 
required by the law. They are very far, therefore, from constituting, for the 
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judge, the covering law he needs in order to state the causation relationship in 
scientific and therefore penally satisfactory terms”.  The counterfactual – the 
Court goes on to say – aimed at identifying the necessary condition, is 
impossible due to “the impossibility of knowing if the patient died due to that 
lack of treatment or, on the other hand, due to the residual 50% of causes, 
which, despite the treatment, could have led to his death in any case”.  In other 
words, if “the event can have been caused by a certain conduct”, but “may also 
have not”, it must be excluded that the omissive conduct can be defined as the 
necessary condition for the event.  The truth is – the Court concluded – that 
“‘perhaps’ lays in the reign of the ‘possible’, ‘perhaps’ is not probability close to 
certainty, and does not represent a percentage of cases close to 100”, a lot 
more is needed for a sentence, i.e. ex post demonstration of the instantiation 
of a covering law with frequency close to 100. 
 
2) Second case (Musto case) (87). 
 
 A women who had been receiving treatment for recurring attacks of 
tachycardia since she was a child, was diagnosed by her GP as having “Wolf 
Parkinson White’s syndrome”, consisting in “the presence of accessory 
anatomical connections – actual bridges between the atrium and the ventricle 
– composed of myocardial fibres parallel to the normal atrium ventricle 
conduction system”. This syndrome, over the years, had been controlled with 
pharmacological treatment, until Dr. Musto, in July 1993, had suggested to the 
patient, obtaining her consent, to resolve the pathology once and for all by 
ablation treatment of the so-called “anomalous section”.  However, the ablation 
treatment was not successful; on the contrary it resulted in a small lesion along 
the coronary cavity.  The patient went into a coma due to serious brain 
damage caused by cerebral anoxia and died following a cardio-surgical 
operation.  The Court of Appeal confirmed the sentence of the Naples trial 
Court, holding that “the causal relationship can be affirmed even when the 
doctor’s work, if correctly and immediately carried out, led not to certainty, but 
only to serious and appreciable possibilities of success, so that the patient’s 
life, with a certain probability, would have been saved ....  The statistic data 
offered by the expert, concerning similar cases in which patients were saved, 
make it possible to state that an immediate diagnosis and immediate actions to 
remedy the cardiac tamponage, would have prevented the cerebral anoxia that 
caused the patient’s death”.  Crim. sect. IV of the Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction and sent the case back to the Court of Appeal, affirming doubtlessly 
wrong the statement on the sufficiency of serious and appreciable probabilities 
of success and observing that reference to the expert’s statistics represents an 
undemonstrated statement. Those statistics were not specified and subjected 
to critical scrutiny: “in fact it is only by knowing these statistics that we can 
understand if it was ascertained that, with a probability close to certainty, with 
a probability close to 100, that conduct ...... was the necessary cause of the 
event as it occurred hic et nunc”.    
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In short, ex ante probabilities must be quantified because, if they are 
not, the judge is not able to verify, ex post, if the conduct and event constitute 
the instantiation of the chain of typical conducts–events indicated by a 
covering law with frequency close to 100. 
 
3) Third case (Di Cintio case) (88). 
 
 The doctor on duty at the emergency department of a hospital, called 
out to the home of a patient, did not ask for the patient to be admitted to 
hospital, even though at the time of the visit “the latter had a neurological 
situation characterised by loss of consciousness and loss of urine”.  When the 
patient was hospitalised the following day, a myocardial infarction was 
diagnosed. The delay in hospitalisation made therapy unfeasible and the 
patient died “due to acute myocardial infarction complicated by bilateral 
pneumonia, ischemic lesions in the area of the right cerebral artery, atrial 
fibrillation, congestive cardiac decompensation with pulmonary oedema and 
acute respiratory failure with bradyarhythmia and with terminal cardiogenic 
shock”.  The Court of Appeal convicted the doctor for failure to ask for 
hospitalisation of the patient in a medical situation “clearly indicated by loss of 
consciousness, even if temporary, and by loss of urine”, observing that if the 
patient had been hospitalised immediately, he would almost certainly have 
been saved.  Crim. sect. IV of the Supreme Court confirmed, observing that 
“from the juridical point of view, the causal relationship is affirmed not in terms  
of a scientifically unachievable certainty, but in terms of almost certainty, not in 
terms of a percentage equal to 100, but in terms of coefficient percentages 
close to 100, a little less than 100”. To say that the patient would almost 
certainly have been saved means making a statement equivalent to that of a 
probability close to 100%. 
 Perhaps we should criticize the trial judgement reached by the Court of 
Appeal on this matter. In fact it is difficult to give credit to the idea that the 
patient could almost certainly have been saved if he had been hospitalised 
immediately. In the debate, the expert affirmed that at the time it occurred “the 
infarction was already at the second or third stage”, i.e. it was a very extensive 
infarction and that the complications that arose during hospitalisation, directly 
proportional to the infarction area, “once they had occurred, were difficult to 
control”. As we have seen, however (prev. par. 3) a high percentage of 
patients hospitalised immediately for myocardial infarction die as a result of 
acute cardiogenic shock. Therefore, to support the conviction there should 
have been proof (impossible) that the patient certainly or almost certainly 
would not have died from shock. 
 
13. The possibility of overcoming the split existing within the Supreme Court.  – 
In conclusion, we must notice that two opposing trends exist within the 
jurisprudential sphere of crim. sect. IV of the Supreme Court. For the first one   
the concept of ex ante probabilities must be abandoned and replaced by an 
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indefinite criterion of a logical probability which corresponds to the inscrutable 
opinion of the judge; for the second, the specific causal statement must have 
a very high ex post probability (as we have seen, 0.999) of being instantiated, 
a probability that can only be reached if it is supported by a statistical law with 
a frequency close to 100. 
 This “split” within the jurisprudence of the IV crim. sect. is still  
preventing the raising of a new consensus; nevertheless it is not unreasonable 
to forecast that the split will soon be eliminated, since those who reject the 
idea of the instantiation of a statistical law with a frequency close to 100 have 
no arguments to support their point of view. There are, on the contrary, many 
convincing arguments to support the other trend. 
This means that criminal trials for omission, on the part of the doctor, of 
the proper necessary conduct, are destined to decrease drastically because 
very often it is impossible to prove that, if the omitted proper conduct had been 
carried out, the harmful event would not have occurred with an ex post 
probability of 99.9  following the application  of a statistical law with frequency 
close to 100. 
However, in our country too, the idea that we must take the path of civil 
liability has to replace the old penal practice, especially because the penalty 
of compensation of damage is certainly better equipped with higher profiles of 
deterrence than the criminal penalty. (Think to the “punitive damages” of 
American civil jurisprudence).      
Once this path has been taken, it will be possible to create a civil 
jurisprudence based on the concept of the “lost chances”: the causal 
relationship, that in many cases can not be demonstrated  in  the criminal trial, 
will on the other hand be easy to verify by identifying the damage not in the 
harmful event itself, but in the decrease of “possibilities of survival or recovery” 
linked to the omitted proper conduct (89).  
 
 
14. Particolaristic proof on what really happened and the elimination of the 
problem of omissive causation.  – On the other hand, sometimes consideration 
of what really happened can allow us to understand that the problem of 
omissive causation has been misplaced. 
I can remember, here, amongst others, two recent cases (90).  The first 
concerns the charge against a team of doctors for having made a late 
diagnosis of intestinal infarction: the ex ante probabilities of a successful 
operation were around 10-30%, but the particularistic proof offered by the 
operating journal and by the description of the patient’s situation made by the 
pathologist had shown not only that these ex ante probabilities were not 
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instantiated but that, if it had really been late, the diagnosis would have had 
the effect of prolonging the patient’s life rather than shortening it. 
 The second case concerns the charge against a heart surgeon for 
having implanted a faulty cardiac valve in a patient; if the omitted proper 
conduct had been carried out, and the quality of the valve had been controlled 
before the operation, death some months later due to breakage of the valve, 
would not have occurred.  Here again the ex ante probability of a successful 
operation with a faultless valve appears high; but here too the particularistic 
proof shows, through a careful and accurate check made by the judge’s 
experts, that those ex ante probabilities were not instantiated because 
breakage of the valve turned out to be due to the violent cardiac massage 
carried out in the hospital’s emergency department where the patient had been 
admitted after feeling ill. 
 In both cases, the ex post probabilities associated to the particularistic 
proof were clearly higher than a threshold “very close to 1”. 
 Perhaps we should illustrate in detail the reasons for acquittal at both 
trials. 
 First case: a patient is admitted to hospital and is defined “at dramatic 
risk” having had four strokes, one heart attack, a bypass operation, an 
aneurysm of the abdominal aorta, serious kidney failure, a peripheral 
arteropathy of the limbs, a stenosis of the succlavian artery and hypertension.  
A whole medical team was prosecuted because – according to the Prosecution 
– a late diagnosis had been made of an intestinal infarction in the patient while 
he was in hospital: the delay in diagnosis was supposed to have caused a 
delay in surgery that did not manage to save the patient’s life. 
The Prosecutor focused on the delayed diagnosis: the symptoms shown 
by the patient, (first constipation, then diarrhoea, fever, leucocytosis and pain 
at palpation) were supposedly wrongly interpreted by the medical team which, 
for several days, did not suspect intestinal infarction, thus making impossible 
an immediate operation that would have given the patient a probability of 
between 10 to 30% of survival. 
 The patient died following surgery. Result of the post-mortem: death 
due to multi-organic failure caused by the thrombotic occlusion of the 
mesentery, complicated by gangrenous intestinal necrosis, toxic-infectious 
state, shock and pneumonia.  All of this – according to the Prosecution – would 
not have happened if the operation had been carried out immediately. 
What happened? The Prosecution expert had failed to analyse the post 
mortem results and above all had completely neglected to examine the 
operating diary.  In the debate, the pathologist had clearly explained, also by 
means of photographs, that occlusion of the lumen of the mesenteric artery by 
a fibrinoleucocytarious thrombus was recent and dated back to only just a few 
hours before the patient’s death, and had also indicated the serious drop in 
pressure which the patient suffered, at a certain moment during the operation. 
 But the operating diary revealed astonishing details: it appeared from 
this diary that the large intestinal infarction, ascertained during the post-
mortem, had developed after the operation, following the so-called “low range 
syndrome”, while what the surgeon had operated on was a very small 
infarction. 
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 In conclusion: the cause of the patient’s death was not the thrombotic 
occlusion of the vessel, dating back to some hours before, but a break-down in 
the haemodynamic balances, the result of surgery on a high risk individual.  
According to the pathologist, the cause of the death was to be found in the 
generalized arteriopathy that was so extensive and serious that, if the 
operation had been carried out earlier, it would have accelerated the death of 
the patient, instead of giving him more chances of survival. 
 The monocratic Court of Milan considered this situation decisive, 
irrespective of the consideration that the operation for intestinal infarction is a 
high mortality event (from 70 to 90%) even in individuals without the 
pathologies found in the patient. 
As we can see, this case proves exactly what we were saying about ex 
post investigations on the basis of available evidence, very strongly quoted by 
the Full Bench. 
 From the medium-low frequency of cases of survival, in the case of an 
immediate operation on a patient with intestinal infarction, of around 10-30% 
we do not get any information about what would really have happened. In the 
case presented by the Prosecution, if the operation had been carried out some 
time before, the patient would have died earlier.  
 The truth is that in a trial for medical negligence the Prosecutor finds 
himself in the same situation as the doctor: he must proceed with the inductive 
method and collect very extensive data; he must put all available evidence 
“into a state of siege” in order to arrive at a formulation of the hypothesis. What 
the Prosecutor in the case at hand did not do, was to prompt his experts to 
observe “all the facts”, to formulate the hypothesis and to submit it to attempts 
of falsification, on the basis of further factual checks (91). 
 Second case: an innovative heart valve in pyrolytic carbon was inserted 
in a man of 44 years of age, suffering from aortic stenosis and with a 
congenital coronary anomaly, in a skilfully-performed and perfectly successful 
operation.  After some months, the man was taken to the emergency 
department in cardio-circulatory and respiratory arrest. A prolonged heart 
massage was carried out in vain but all the doctors could do was to ascertain 
his death. The Prosecution charged the heart surgeon with manslaughter for 
having failed to ascertain the composition, resistance and quality of the heart 
valve: during the post-mortem, faults had been found in the valve that 
explained why it had broken. 
 During the debate it appeared that the valve had become distorted, but 
after the heart massage had been carried out.  In fact, if the fracture had 
occurred previously – according to the Prosecutor’s expert - heart failure would 
have been hyper-acute and the death would have occurred within just a few 
minutes. 
Here again, what happened?  The Prosecution expert had shown that 
he did not have full knowledge of the applicable rules and basic technical 
notions; the examination he carried out had been extremely superficial, the 
hypothesis he had made following which the death of the patient was due to 
breakage of the valve had been equally superficial and rash.  The experts 
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nominated by the judge, on the other hand, had concluded their report by 
affirming that the elements collected were “strongly suggestive” of a “mode of 
death consisting in a ventricular arhythmia supported by an ischemic 
substratum”: i.e. by a condition that had resulted in hospitalisation in the 
emergency department. 
 And it was actually at the emergency department – as emerged during 
the debate – that the patient was subjected to a violent and prolonged 
massage that explains the breakage of the prosthesis. On that occasion, the 
prosthesis was subjected to strong stress that caused it to break, as a series of 
lesions of the thorax and subcutaneous bruises established.  
 These were the conclusions of the Court: “all the experts agree in 
stating that breakage of the valve would have led to the death of the patient 
within a few minutes and not, as in this case, after an appreciable period of 
time and not after being admitted to the emergency department;..... therefore, 
we can safely state that death was not caused by breakage of the valve 
before the patient was admitted to the emergency department”. 
 As we can see, this is a similar situation to the previous one: the facts, 
the available evidence were placed “in a state of siege” during the debate, 
through the examination and cross-examination of experts of the two parties. 
The Prosecutor relied on the evidence gathered by his pathologist with a 
technique that one expert of the defence defined as typical of “the Third 
World”. 
 This is how disputes on omissive causation often arise: with techniques 
typical of the Third World. 
 The moral to be drawn is that very often the omitted proper conduct 
seems to be on the part of the Prosecution and its experts.  And it is here that 
the reference of the Full Bench to the duty, on the part of the judge, to carry 
out a rigorous ex post verification of all available evidence assumes a very 
sound significance. Only with this inductive verification the problem of omissive  
causation is solved at the root. In the latter case, it is ex post evidence that 
shows that we are not faced by an omitted proper conduct (failure to check the 
quality of the characteristics of the heart valve) but in presence of a hypotesis 
of active causation that cannot be attributed to the defendant. 
 Once again the warning of the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the Daubert case proves to be true: judges must exercize much greater control 
over experts than over witnesses, because experts can draw conclusions that 
are so misleading that they could result in the conviction of innocent individuals 
(92).     
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